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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the international financial relations of the inter—
war period to see what light this experience sheds on current concerns
over international policy coordination. The analysis proceeds in three
parts. The first part considers the role for policy coordination as
viewed by contemporaries at the start of the period; it takes as a case
study the Genoa Economic and Financial Conference of 1922. Efforts at
Genoa to coordinate policies ended in failure; the second part therefore
considers the effects of noncooperative strategies within the framework
of the interwar gold standard. The analytical model developed in this
section suggests that the failure to coordinate policies lent a deflationary
bias to the world economy which may have contributed to the onset of the
Great Depression. The third part asks what policymakers learned from
this failure to coordinate policies, taking evidence from the next effort
to establish a framework for international financial collaboration: the
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in the days of the gold standard, it is sometimes said, international
policy coordination was a moot point.1 Popular accounts based more on
caricature than on careful historical analysis portray the gold standard as
a remarkably efficient mechanism for coordinating the actions of national
authorities. Policies were so easily reconciled, it is argued, because
those responsible for their formulation, regardless of nationality, shared
a belief of balanced budgets and a common overriding objective: pegging the
domestic currency price of gold. When central banks intervened in
financial markets, it is suggested, they did so mechanically, obeying
"rules of the game" which dictated that they only reinforce the impact on
domestic money and credit markets of balance of payments conditions. For
example, a central bank losing reserves would raise its discount rate while
the central bank gaining reserves would lower its discount rate, thereby
reinforcing one anothers efforts to restore external balances Hence
monetary policy under the gold standard is a favorite example of those who
argue that international policy coordination is most readily achieved under
a rules—based regime rather than one that depends on discretion.
This naive vision of the days of the gold standard as a simpler, moreharmonious era is at best partial and at worst misleading. The very
actions of central banks suggest that their objectives were not in fact so
easily reconciled by the operation of gold standard constraints. Discount
rates tended to move together, notinverselyas the 'rules of the game
would suggest.2 Central bankssterilizedinternational gold flows more
often than theyintervenedto reinforce their impact on domestic
markets. These and other actions resemble the outcome of a
noncooperative game, in which the participants act to neutralize rather
than accommodate the efforts of their counterparts. Yet on occasion central
banks and governments managed to achieve cooperative solutions to their
problems, such as when they negotiated swap arrangements, earmarked gold,
or extended international loans.4 Both central banks and governments
clearly recognized their interdependence, if they did not always succeed in
coordinating their actions.
Still, it is fair to say that the interwar period opened the modern
era of interdependence.In the 1920s questions of policy coordination and
central bank cooperation acquired a new tone of urgency.In part this
reflected greater opportunities for coordinating policies in a world with a
Bank for International Settlements, an international telegraph, and a
trans-tlantic telephone. In part it reflected the higher costs of
ignoring interdependence in a world of rapid communication, integrated
markets and volatile capital flows. above all it reflected the widening
scope far conflict as governments attached growing importance to domestic
economic objectives and put less weight or balance of payments targets.
The interwar period provides examples of various forms of successful
collaboration. The League of Nations provided stabilization loans to
countries experiencing hyperinflation in return for their accession to
protocols which precluded their central banks from monetizing budgetdeficits and committed them to return to gold. international conferences
held at Brussels in 1920 and Genoa in 1922 laid the basis for
reconstructing the international monetary system. The United States saw
Britains return to gold as the iinchpin upon which the gold standard's
resurrection depended, and it provided credits of $300 million to
facilitate Britains restoration of the prewar sterling parity.6 These
efforts were fully successful in reconstructing the international system:
once its renewal had been signaled by Britain's return to gold, some fifty
nations joined the U.S. and the U.K. as participants in the interwar gold
standard.
Yet the interwar period provides equally dramatic illustrations of
failures of cooperation and their costs. The brief duration and early
demise of the interwar gold standard is taken to indicate the inability of
major participants to effectively coordinate their actions. prime
example is the failure of the countries at the center to harmonize their
choice of parities. The important cases are Great Britain, where over—
valuation of sterling was associated with unprecedented levels of
unemployment and depression in the export trades; and France, where
undervaluation of the franc was associated with sustained economic growth
and until 1931 insulation from the worst effects of the Great
Depression. One corollary of this competitive imbalance was an uneven
international distribution of gold. Nations such as the United States and
France whose international competitive positions were relatively strong
acquired and retained a large portion of the worlds monetary gold, leaving
others such as Britain to defend the convertibility of their currencies on
the basis of slender reserves. Another indication of this inability to
coordinate policies was the widespread failure to play by the rules of the4
gold standard game; instead central banks sterilized international reserve
flowsandhesitated to adjust their discount rates in response to exterral
pressures.
This paper takes a new look at the financial history of the interwar
period to see what light this experience sheds on current concerns over
international policy coordination. After a review of the literature and
the historical preconditions, it tells a story inthreeparts. The First
part examines the role for oiiCy coordination as envisaged by
contemporaries at the start of the period.It takes as a case study the
Genoa Economic andFinancialConference of 1922. We will argue that the
advantages ofpolicycoordination were in fact well understood in the
'twenties but that political disagreements impeded efforts to establish a
mochanss for cooperative action. Instead, policymakers ultimately pursued
noncooperative strategies within the framework of the international gold
standard.
The second part considers the effects of noncooperative behavior once
the gold standard was again in operation. Identifying these effects
requires an explicit model. Yet the idea of strategic behavior by national
authorities is wholly incompatible with standard models of the gold
standard's operation. The analysis therefore requires the development of
an alternative model of the interwar gold standard. While the model
developed below bears little resemblance to previous frameworks used to
analyze gold standard adjustment, it indicates clearly not only the
advantages of coordinated action but suggests why cooperative solutions
proved 50 difficult to achieve.
The final part concerns the question of what the principal
participants learned from their pursuit of noncooperative strategies. The
lessons of the interwar gold standard as they were understood by5
contemporaries found reflection in the next attempt to reconstruct the
international monetary order: the Tripartite Monetary Agreement concluded
byGritain,France and the United States in the autumn of l936. The
terms of the Tripartite Agreement were remarkably similar to the Genoa
Resolutions of 1922. Where they differed was in the absence of favorable
references to fixed parities and to the gold—exchange standard. They
differed as well by mare tightly circumscribing the range of issues subject
to collaboration. This along with the decline of political obstacles to
cooperation permitted the noble sentiments of the Tripartite Agreement to
be implemented. Thus, the history of international financial collaboration
in the interwar period sheds light not onlyon therationale for policy
coordination but also on the circumstances conducive to its practice.
I.Leadership and Cooperation Under A Gold Standard Regime
In theoretical treatments of the gold standards operation, there is
no scope for policy coordination. The adjustment process works
automatically, affecting surplus and deficit countriesalike. The price—
specie—flow variant of the adjustment mechanism emphasizes the role of relative
prices in restoring external balance. A gold outflow leads to monetary
deflation and falling prices until the international competitiveness of the
goods produced by the deficit country is enhanced sufficiently to restore
equilibrium to the external accounts. The monetary variant of the
adjustment mechanism stresses the role of wealth and real balance effects.
A gold outflow reduces absorption through the real balance effect on
consumption until the equality of income and expenditure is restored. In
each case, the surplus country is affected symmetrically. Beyond standing
ready to buy and sell gold at the official price, the only role for central
banks is to mechanically reinforce the impact on domestic money and credit6
markets of incipient gold flows.
Strikingly, these theoretical treatments bear little resemblance to
historical analyses of the gold standard's operation either at the end of
the 19th century or between the wars. Where theoretical models describe
central banks as mechanically reinforcing one another's actions, historical
accounts emphasize instead the potential for conflict between national
authorities and their strategic interaction. Yet in none of these
accounts is the scope for conflict adequately defined, leaving unclear the
advantages of leadership andcooperation.
Historical descriptions of the classical gold standard place great
weight on asymmetries in the system's operation. Great Britain in
particular is seen as possessing unrivaled abilities to manipulate the
process of adjustment. Britain's market power is attributed toher
position as the world's foremost trading and lending nation. British
exports, which had already quadrupled between 1800 and 1850, increased
eightfold between 1850 and 1913, and on the eve of the first World War
Britain accounted for 14 percent of world exports, a figure far exceeding
her share of world production or income. The world's principal organized
commodity markets all were centered in England. Not the least of these was
the London gold market, which regularly received the bulk of South Africas
gold production. In addition, Britain had no close competitor as the
world's preeminent international lender. By 1913, British overseas
investments amounted to nearly 45 percent of the external investments of
the major creditor countries of the West. Britain's annual capital export
was nearly five times that of France, her nearest rival. Never before
or since have a nation's overseas investments been such a large share of
national income.87
Britain's commercial and financial preeminence had profound
implications for the international role of sterling, which had implications
in turn for the operation of the adjustment mechanism. Sterling was the
world's leading vehicle currency in international transactions. Trade that
neither touched British shores nor passed through the hands of British
merchants overseas might nonetheless be invoiced in sterling. Transactions
the world over were settled with the transfer of sterling balances between
foreign accounts maintained in London. Securities denominated in sterling
were the most popular form of international reserves with which central
banks might supplement their stocks of gold.9
Under these circumstances, itisargued, the Bank of England
exercised powerful leverage over international flows of commodities,
capital and gold —leverageit could employ to manipulate the process of
adjustment by which external balance was restored. Changes in Bank Rate
(the rate charged by the Bank of England for loans to discount houses and
other dealers in Treasury and commercial bills) exerted an influence not
shared by foreign discount rates and to a large extent determined credit
conditions not merely at home but abroad.'° A rise in Bank Rate is
typically thought to have forced up the required rate of return on Treasury
and commercial bills, and by rendering these assets more attractive
increased the opportunity cost to the banking sector of extending loans and
overdrafts to borrowers. Given the share of sterling loans and advances in
international markets for short—term capital, rates of return on foreign—
currency—denominated assets that were substitutes for sterling were forced
up as well. Moreover, because the world's most important gold market also
was located in London, the Bank of England by altering the cost and
availability of short—term credit directly influenced the tendency of non—
residents to purchase and ship abroad gold newly delivered to market.B
To paraphrase Walter Bagehot's famous aphorism, raising Bank Rate to
a sufficiently high level would succeed in drawing gold from the moon.
This leverage over capital flows followed from the Fact that no foreign
powercould match theBank of England's influence in international
financial markets. The United States, without even a central bank, lacked
the resources and the expertise to rival Britain in the market. The Bank
of Frances sphere of influence was limited to Russia and France's colonial
possessions. Foreign authorities possessed no feasible alternative but to
respond to Bank of England initiatives, as the British understood. Hence,
the Bank of England could anticipate with considerable accuracy the
response of foreign authorities to a change in Bank Rate in London, and it
could frame its policy accordingly. To the Deputy Governor of the Bank of
England Keynes described the reaction of foreign governments in the
following way: "In prewar days it used to be maintained——I think truly——
that to a large extent we led the world; that is to say, if we reduced Bank
rate it probably brought about a corresponding reduction in the rates in
other countries."11 As he framed the argument when helping to draft
the report of the Macmillan Committee, Britain could "by the operation of
her Bank Rate almost immediately adjust her reserve position. Other
countries had, therefore, in the main, to adjust their conditions to
1,,£4.. her
There is little agreement on the costs and benefits of the Bank of
England's exercise of leadership. The benign view of the prewar
arrangement is that it operated to the benefit of both the leader and her
followers by permitting the participants in the gold standard system to
economize in their use of gold. The Bank of England could maintain a
slender gold reserve because she had the power to reverse a gold outflow9
through unilateral initiative. Other central banks, such as those of
France, Germany, ustria-Hungary and Russia, had less leverage over
financial flows and were therefore forced to hold larger reserves in order
to accommodate wider swings in their reserve positions. But due to the
Bank of England's capacity to operate with relatively slender reserves, the
gold backing of the world's monetary base could be efficiently reduced.
Since the BankofEngland's leverage over international capital flows
erased any lingering doubts about the convertibility of sterling, other
countries were encouraged to supplement their holdings of gold with this
key currency further augmenting international reserves to the benefit of
all concerned.
less sanguine view is that through her exercise of market power
Britain was capable of shifting the burden of adjustment abroad. Triffin
has argued that, due to London's singular importance as a source of credit
for financing international transactions in foodstuffs and raw materials,
Britain was through the impact of Bank Rate overseas more than compensated
for the economic costs of stringent credit conditions.'3 The argument
is that a temporary credit stringency swung the terms of trade in Britains
favor by increasing the cost to foreign producers of carrying stocks of
primary products. Given the higher cost of holding inventories, stocks of
foodstuffs and raw materials were dumped onto world markets, reducing the
cost of British imports. Obviously, carrying costs were important as well
to British producers of manufactured exports, who had the same incentive as
producers of primary commodities to liquidate stocks in the face of tighter
credit conditions. assuming however that the market for primary products
was characterized by exceptionally low price elasticities of demand,
Britain's international terms of trade would still have improved on
'4
bal ance.By the interwar period, it is frequently suggested, circumstances had
been transformed. Britain no longer possessed unparalleled influence aver
the international adjustment mechanism. Other nations had acquired
sufficient leverage to formulate if not independent then at least
distinctive national policies, leaving the Bank of England in no better
position than its rivals to ignore developments abroad.In particular, the
interwar period has been characterized as the era when London declined at
the expense of New York) The war and its aftermath had transformed
the United States from a net debtor to a net creditor, and she suddenly
found herself in possession of a large share of the world's monetary gold.
When Britain returned to gold in 1925, U.S. gold reserves were roughly six
times those of the Bank of England. The British government owed the U.S.
4.7 billion in war debts, although their ultimate magnitude and the
schedule by to which they might be repaid remained very much in doubt.
Moreover, Washington was newly equipped with a Federal Reserve Board and
New York with a Federal Reserve Bank to direct and carry out financial
market intervention.
Through the first part of the 'twenties New York surpassed London as
a source of funds invested abroad. The U.K. 's share of world export value
declined from 14 percent in 1913 to barely 12 percent in 1925 and little
more than ii percent in 1928. Before the war, Britain had consistently run
current account surpluses; in the century ending in 1913 there had been but
two years of deficit. The situation was different between the wars; in the
short span from 1925 to 1931 there were already two years of current
account deficit. Bankers and merchants, finding themselves to be
dealing with both financial centers and running down the balances on
sterling accounts maintained in London, increasingly held diversified11
portfolios of the two key currencies.
The British position was not eased by concurrent developments in
France. Unlike Britain, France's share of world trade was stable after
1913. Following de facto stabilization in 1926 at a rate which
undervalued the franc, France's external position remained strong until
Britain's devaluation in 1931 In 1928, when de jure convertibility of
the franc was restored, the Bank of France's holdings of liquid sterling
assets roughly matched in value the Bank of England's entire gold reserve.
Overthe next four years, the Bank of France engaged in a persistent effort
to convert these balances into gold as part of a conscious policy of
17 elevating Paris to the stature of a firstrank financial center.
The British authorities recognized their heightened interdependence
with foreign nations. In particular, the Bank of England found it
impossible to neglect the reaction of foreign central banks to a
prospective change in Bank Rate. Were the Bank of England to disregard
foreign reactions when setting its discount rate, it would "render itself
liable to be flooded with, or depleted of, gold, as the casemay be." As
high an official as the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England admitted
that "such leadership as we possessed has certainly been affected by the
position which American has gained."8
While policymakers clearly recognized their heightened
interdependence, the implications of this recognition remain somewhat
unclear. One literature attempts to document the stimulus this recognition
of interdependence provided for cooperative action. For example, Clarke
(1967) describes instances where central banks extended to one another
routine clearing services, shared privileged information, and arranged
international stabilization loans. Another literature emphasizes the
inability of policymakers to coordinate their actions despite thisrecognition of interdependence. Thus, Viner (1932, p. 28) and Gayer (1937,
p. 29) describe London, Paris and New York as having worked at "cross—
purposes." Yet it is not easy to extract from their analyses a sense of
how working at cross—purposes affected the operation of the monetary
system. In part this is due to the tendency of these authors to argue by
analogy rather than specifying the economic model they have in mind. Nevin
(19, p. 12) is typical of this mode when, likening the international
monetary system to an automobile, he characterizes Britain and the United
States as "two quite excellent drivers. .perpetually fighting to gain
control of the vehicle," A system influenced by the actions of two
financial centers, like a car with two drivers, will function only if those
centers are capable of cooperating and acting consistently. But, he goes
on, "in the real world, this seldom happens, and the existence of more than
one centre with powers of control leads to the existence of more than one
policy." What we would like to know is whether the presence of two
chauffeurs causes the car to be driven too fast, too slow, or too
erratically, and what the implications of the chauffeurs' behavior is for
the welfare of the passengers.
Arguments by analogy, however appealing, provide no answer to these
questions. The historian's instinct is to turn to the documents far
guidance. The economist's is to construct a model. We consider these
approaches in turn.
II. The Genoa Conference of 1922 and the Role for Cooperation
When the Genoa Economic and Financial Conference convened in April
1922, European exchange and trade relations were in disarray. Physical
devastation in the main theaters of the war created persistent excess
demands for foodstuffs and raw materials, particularly in Central and.13
Eastern Europe. Capital goods imports were needed to replace plant and
equipment destroyed in the course of the war. Yet the nations of
Continental Europe possessed limited resources out of which to finance the
required imports, Industrial and agricultural production remained well
10 below1913 levels, 'TheUnited States curtailed and quickly
eliminated official lending to its European allies, insisted an prompt
repayment of its war loans, and constrained Europe's capacity to earn
foreign exchange by sharply raising tariff rates. Europe therefore
turned to deficit spending to finance economic reconstruction.Some
such as the French proceeded on the premise that Reparations payments would
eventually permit any new debt to be retired and prewar monetary
arrangements to be restored. Others such as the Germans were preoccupied
almost entirely by the immediate problem of reconstruction. By the summer
of 1920 the mark had already begun its descent; the franc, in contrast,
fluctuated uneasily in response to new information about prospects for
Reparations.
In Western Europe and the United States, the Armistice had been
followed by a sudden and dramatic boom. Consumers finally were permitted
to vent demands that had been pent up during the war, and producers took
the opportunity to replenish their stocks. In Britain the pressure of
demand led to an inflation of prices unprecedented in peacetime.
Employment expanded rapidly, and wages rose in response. In light of these
inflationary pressures, the Bank of England raised its discount rate in
November 1919 and April 1920. Almost simultaneously, industrial production
turned down, and unemployment among trade union members rose from 1.4 to
16.7 percent within a year. Wholesale prices fell by nearly 50 percent
between the spring of 1920 and the beginning of 1922.In France wholesale14
prices turned down in May, falling by 41 percent within a year, while the
index of industrial production fell by eight percent between 1920 and 1921.
In the United States fluctuations in industrial production, while not as
pronounced as in Britain, followed basically the same pattern, while
wholesale prices fell by46percent in the 10 months following their May
1920 peak.21
As in the 1970s, financial instability impeded efforts to liberalize
international trade. Since the major belligerants had all imposed trade
controls in the course of the war, they had in place the administrative
machinery needed to administer import licensing and quota schemes. While
some such as Britain rapidly moved to dismantle wartime controls, others
such as France, which initially emulated the British example, turned back
to tariff protection once their currencies began to depreciate. Trade with
central Europe was further depressed by the slow recovery of these
economies. Together with the embargo on Russian trade, the prospects for
an export—led recovery appeared dim.
The Reparations question cast a shadow over attempts at monetary
reconstruction and impeded efforts to arrange cooperative solutions to
Europe's financial problems. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles
designed to provide a mechanism by which realistic Reparations claims
might be negotiated were disabled by the refusal of the U.S. Congress to
ratify the Treaty. The Treaty itself deferred final determination of the
amount of Reparations but required an initial payment of 200,000 million
'7,)
goldmarks, the first installment falling due in May 1921.' When the
Reparations Commission, staffed not by financial experts but by politicians
taking instructions from their governments, finally determined the value of
Reparations in April 1921, the amount was fixed at $32 billion, three times
the sum recommended by the economic experts at Versailles and a much larger15
amount than the Germans anticipated.In principle, the transfer might be
made by payment in gold, payment in services, or payment in commodities.
Yet the Reichsbank's gold reserve barely amounted to one semi—annual
Reparations payment. German guest workers would scarcely be welcomed in
neighboring countries already experiencing high unemployment. Thus,
Germany had no alternative buttoattempt to finance its transfer through
anexport surplus. The value ofthe transfer Germany might have
accomplishedgiven the impact of a surplus on her terms of trade has been
debated ever since.2 The only certainty from the point of view of
financial market participants was that the magnitude and timing of
Reparations payments would remain uncertain, with unknown implications for
thepublic finances of the major creditor countries.
This was the background against which the Genoa Conference of 1922
was convened. Genoa was only one in a series of international monetary and
financial conferences held in the 1920s, and negotiations there were not
unrelated to previous meetings at Brussels in 1920 and at Cannes in January
1922w For example, the participants in the Brussels Conference had issued
declarations which resembled in general terms the resolutions subsequently
adoptedat Genoa. However, only at Genoa were the particulars of these
proposalsspecified and methods for implementing them through the
international coordination of policies given explicit consideration.
The countries with greatest influence over the proceedings at Genoa
were the United States, France and Britain. The three nations approached
the Conference with very different objectives. Despite other differences
the Americans and the British shared a common interest in rebuilding the
international economy. The leaders of both nations agreed thatrecovery
required the revitalization of foreign trade, for which reconstruction ofthe gold standard was a necessary prerequisite. Beyond these general
goals, however, the two sets of policymakers had little in common. The
British were willing to go considerably further than the Americans to
promote the expansion of trade. They hoped that diplomatic and commercial
relations with the Soviet government could be established and that
Reparatior;s could be reduced. To facilitate the renegotiation of
Reparations, theysuggestedthat the United States forgive at least a
portion of its war debt claims. With this groundwork laid, they hoped that
the creditor countries would be encouraged to extend loans to the European
debtors, promoting economic recovery on the Continent and stimulating
nternationaitrade.
While restoring sterlingsprewar parity was seen asan essential
elementof monetary reconstruction, the British were wary of the economic
costs that the deflation associated with restoration might entail. From
their perspective the preferred solution was inflation abroad rather than
deflation at home ——inparticular, inflation in the United States. The
British contemplated various schemes to encourage the Americans to inflate,
ranging from subtle diplomatic pressure to a far—fetched plan to
immediately pay in gold a large share of Britain's war debt in order to
drastically expand the American monetarybase.24 This last scheme was
dismissed due to the likelihood of American sterilization and its impact on
the Bank of Englands reserve position.It would be preferable for
monetary expansion to be initiated abroad and backed as necessary by
reserves of foreign exchange. That a significant portion of foreign
exchange reserves would be held in the form of sterling undoubtedly figured
in British calculations.'
Although the Americans shared Britain's interest in promoting the
expansion of world trade, from their vantage point the problem was less17
pressing. They were willing to participate in discussions of international
economic policy only as part of a general settlement. While Herbert Hoover
and his Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, expressed an interest in
convening in what the President termed a "real honest—to—God economic
conference" designed to reestablish fixed exchange rates, international
convertiblity and free international movements of commodities and gold,
they evinced little enthusiasm for meetings like those at Genoa which
seemed likely to concentrate on stop—gap measures to be adopted in lieu of
balanced budgets or Reparations settlements, and whose success appeared to
7A
hingeon American concessions regarding war debts. In the end,
Hughes agreed only to send to the Conference as an unofficial observer the
American Ambassador to Rome, Richard Washburn Child.
In contrast to the Americans, the French sought to define the agenda
for Genoa as narrowly as possible. The French opposed British proposals for
universal adoption of nondiscrimination in trade and the most—favored—
nation clause, so they sought to discourage discussion of a general
convention on trade policy. In contrast they pressed for discussion of
sanctions against the Soviet Government on the question of prewar
07 debts.This dispute intensified after January 1922, when Briands
relatively moderate government was replaced by a more nationalistic
administration headed by Poincaré, who commenced almost immediately to
spar over these issues and Reparations with the equally combative Lloyd
George. Poincaré was skeptical about the usefulness of multilateral
negotiations and agreed to participate in the conference only on British
assurances that Frances position on Reparations, the terms of the Treaty
of Versailles, and the Russian Imperial Gbvernment's debt to France would
'B not be questioned.4The monetary proposals discussed at Genoa originated with the British
delegation. In drafting their proposals the British could draw on the
First Interim Report of the Cunliffe Committee and on the considerable
talents of their monetary specialists, notably Ralph 6. Hawtrey, since 1919
29
Director of Financial Enquiries at H.t1.Treasury. number of
Britain's Genoa proposals resembled the Cunliffe Committee's
recommendations! including the argument that a credible commitment to
financial stability required a return to goid.0 Resurrecting the gold
standard, it was stated, required balancing government budgets insulating
central banks from pressure to extend credit to government agencies, and
consolidating national debts. Little was novel in these ideas. More novel
were the measures first proposed by the Cunliffe Committee and incorporated
into the British proposals to economize on the demand for monetary gold:
these included eliminating internal circulation of gold coin, concentrating
gold reserves at the central bank, and permitting domestic residents to
acquire coin and bullion for export only from the authorities. By limiting
the use of gold to international settlements, the Cunliffe Committee and
the British delegates at Genoa sought to minimize competing demands for
reserves.
The British draft was circulated among foreign authorities in
February 1922, and in March experts from Belgium, France, Italy and Japan
met with British representatives in London to undertake revisions. These
proposals were adopted with only slight modification by the Financial
Committee at the Genoa Conference in April and by the Conference itself in
31
May.
The Genoa resolutions contained a number of provisions designed to
ease the transition to gold. These included the recommendation, ultimately
adopted, that governments with significantly depreciated currencies19
consider stabilizing at a lower rate of exchange. While accepting the
argument that prewar parities provided the ideal basis for stabilization,
the experts suggested that countries which had experienced sustained
inflation might be well advised to avoid the output costs associated with
restoring the prewar level of prices. Moreover, they observed that
governments would be seriously burdened by the increased real value of
internal debt which would result from a substantial reduction in
prices.32 Policymakers were therefore encouraged to stabilize at rates
not far distant from those currently prevailing. Significantly for the
operation of the interwar gold standard no sanctions were included to
discourage governments from engaging in competitive depreciation.
The Genoa resolutions also contained proposals to economize on the
use of gold. The measures proposed by the Cunliffe Committee were altered
to meet what the British experts regarded as mounting deflationary
pressures. Resolution 9 on currency adopted by the Financial Commission
urged governments to establish a mechanism to minimize the need for gold by
maintaining reserves in the form of foreign balances, such as the gold
exchange standard, or an international clearing system.
It was in this connection that the issue of policy coordination was
raised. Monetary authorities were encouraged to coordinate their demands
for gold and to avoid the wide fluctuations in internal prices that would
otherwise result from the 'simultaneous and competitive efforts of a number
V 33 of countries to secure metallic reserves. Thus, central banks were
for the first time explicitly urged to desist from the competitive struggle
for gold. These proposals for international cooperation were predicated
upon the establishment of central banks where they did not exist and on
their insulation from political influence or control. Thus, at Genoacountries with relatively stable currencies were therefore urged to adopt
institutional arrangements similar to those imposed by the League of
Nations upon countries undergoing hyperinflation.
The only resolution on international policy coordination acceptable
to all the participating countries was one couched in general terms. While
consultation and collaboration were encouraged, no formal mechanism for
their practice was specified.Instead, the Eank of England was requested
to call an early meeting of central bankers to prepare a convention to
implement these measures. An accompanying resolution warned that the
success of any such plan was contingent upon the participation of the
United States. In the words of the Financial Commission, no scheme for
stabilizing prices can be fully effective without coordination of policy
between Europe and the United States, whose cooperation therefore should be
34
invited.
There is no question that the economic costs of noncooperative
behavior were clearly understood in 1922. Permitting central banks to
engage in a competitive struggle for gold was seen as threatening to
transmit deflationary pressures to the world economy and delaying recovery
from the War. Multilateral negotiations were seen as the most effective
technique for achieving agreement on an acceptable international
distribution of reserves. Vet it was far from apparent how agreement on
this matter might be reconciled with national autonomy on the question of
the level at which to stabilize exchange rates, or how these noble
sentiments might be institutionalized. But if the participants in the
6enoa Conference lacked a coherent view of how policy coordination might be
practiced, they agreed on the principle of responding cooperatively to
international financial problems.
Ultimately, even this modest attempt to provide a framework for21
cooperation proved to be overly ambitious. To the surprise of the
participants, the nextstepin the process, namely the proposed meeting of
central banks, was never held. The Bank of England took the initiative of
discussing the proposed meeting with the Federal Reserve, whose
participation was endorsed bytheU.S.StateDepartment. Once the Bank of
England's Committee of Treasuryapprovedthe tentative invitation drafted
by Norman and Benjamin Strong, a meeting seemed imminent. However,
efforts to convene the meeting met with political obstacles, and the
prospective conference was soon reduced to a mere bargaining chip to be
used n disputes over these other concerns. The French ruled out their
participation unless Reparations were again excluded from the agenda. The
Americans objected that meaningful progress could not be made unless the
Reparations question was reopened.ifl the autumn of 1922 Britain sent a
delegation to Washington to discuss funding the British war debt, and the
Bank of England's involvement in these negotiations again postponed the
meeting of central bankers. France's occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 cast
doubt on Germany participation, and the financial difficulties of ustria
and Hungary was the occasion for further delay. By the summer of 1923,
enthusiasmfor a general convention of central banks had dissipated. This
was not to mark the end of financial collaboration, but subsequent
exchanges between centralbanks took place primarily on a bilateral
3o
basis.
With the failure of the Genoa Conference to yield even a general
framework for international policy coordination, many of the dangers cited
by the financial experts quickly came to pass. There were no sanctions to
discourage governments from stabilizing at parities which yielded a system
of misaligned exchange rates. There was no mechanism for reconciling thecompeting objectives of national monetary authorities nor to prevent
central banks from engaging in what was characterized as a competitive
scramble for gold. The implications of noncooperative behavior within the
framework of the interwar gold standard would become evident soon enough.
III. Leadershi_p and Cooperation Under the Interwar Gold Standard
A.Motivation
Establishinga basis for cooperation among central banks was
clearly one of the principal goals of the policymakers who attempted to lay
the foundation for the gold standard's resurrection. Yet the gold standard
is typically portrayed as a self—equilibrating mechanism under which
external balance is restored to deficit and surplus countries alike through
the smooth operation of an anonymously functioning international adjustment
mechanism. The very concept of conflicting objectives, much less
strategies such as leadership and cooperation, are wholly incompatible with
familiar attempts to model the gold standard's operation. These familiar
models are simply incapable of addressing the questions at hand.
The purpose of this section is therefore to develop an alternative
model of the gold standard with which the issues of leadership and
cooperation can be addressed. No attempt is made to capture the operation
of the international gold standard in all its complexity, for this is not
the model's purpose. Its purpose is rather to provide a simple
macroeconomic framework which highlights the channels through which the
actions of one country's central bank impinge upon the internal and
external position of another and the incentives that these repercussion
effects provide the second country to respond to the actions of the first.
It strips away complications in order to lay bare the dynamics of strategic
interaction and to explore the implications of long—standing arguments23
about the benefits of leadership and cooperation during the interwar
period.
The model is based on the notion that the interwar gold standard can
I. 37 be viewed as an international struggle for gold. Simply put,
central banks in our model desire incompatibly large shares of the worlds
gold reserves. This provides the basis for conflicting objectives and for
strategic interaction.
Despite its simplicity, the model generates several useful insights.
As in any strategic game in which the players hold conflicting objectives,
noncooperative behavior has economic costs compared with cooperative
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solutions. In our model, central banks incapable of coordinating
their policies set their discount rates at undesirably high levels, putting
downward pressure on the level of prices and depressing incomes at home and
abroad. For example, this is the result at the Nash solution to this
noncooperative game. While central bank policy was but one factor at work
in the world economy in the 1920s, this result is suggestive when applied
to a period marked by historically high discount rates, conflicts among
central banks, and steady deflation culminating in a Great Depression.
The Stackelberg leader—follower solution to the two—country model
provides a halfway point between the Nash and cooperative equilibria.
Compared to the Nash solution, the leader—follower solution is less
deflationary and yields higher incomes both at home and abroad. Barring
cooperation, the exercise of leadership clearly is in the interest of both
players; the question is whether either player will choose to exercise it.
In fact, there is an incentive for both players to resist the leadership
role. It is a standard (arid perfectly intuitive) property of models of
symmetrical countries that both players prefer to adopt the same strategy.
We show below that the same holds true in a model of asymmetric countries,24
where one central bank has exceptional power to influence the direction of
international capital flows.
In structure the model has much in common with previous analyses of
policy coordination (see for e>:ample Hamada, 1976 and 1979).It
incorporates the assumption that each central bank has more targets than
instruments, forcing it to confront the tradeoff between its objectives.
This is the assumption of instrument scarcity in whose absence problems of
strategy vanish. In addition, it incorporates the assumption that each
domestic target variable is affected by the actions of the foreign central
bank.Thisis the assueption of interdependence.
There e>ists scope for strategic interaction in a model of the gold
standard only if central banks can e>ercise discretion. We will assume
that central barks are able to engage in discretionary initiatives to alter
thecomposition ofthe monetary base through open market operations or
changes in fiduciary circulation and to affect the size of the money
multiplier through changes in discount rates. While the idea that changes
in central bank discount rates affect the relationship between the gold
reserve and the money supply is a departure from textbook treatments of the
gold standard, it captures the fact that the authorities were capable in
the short run of either reinforcing the impact of incipient gold flows on
domestic financial markets or neutralizing them through sterilization.In
fact, under the gold standard there were important sources of slack in the
connection between gold reserves and broadly defined monetary aggregates.
Central banks could hold gold in excess of that required to back notes in
circulation, enabling them to intervene in financial markets with purchases
of bonds and bills and to alter the monetary base without any accompanying
change in reserves. Only the need to maintain confidence in the25
convertibility of the currency placed limits on their discretionary
actions. Similarly, commercial banks, even if free of statutory reserve
requirements, had an incentive to hold precautionary reserves to guard
against unanticipated withdrawals. The size of such precautionary reserves
was determined in part by the cost of feasible alternatives, including
discounting (in the British case, via discount houses) at the central bank.
Under the British banking system, there was a conventional ratio between a
banks cash and its liabilities which was basically the same whether those
liabilities were demand or time deposits. Nonetheless, the authorities
could influence this ratio and hence affect broadly defined monetary
aggregates throuh changes in the deposit multiplier.9 This was even
more true of the countries of the Continent, where there was typically no
conventional or legal relation between reserve assets and deposits.
Each central bank in our model minimizes a quadratic loss function
defined over gold reserves and domestic prices. Mthough the historical
record suggests that central bankers followed rules of thumb when setting
discount rates, we adopt the assumption of optimizing behavior as a
simplifying device. The assumption that each bank has an optimal gold
reserve is motivated by the observation that, while a central bank could
feel more confident of its ability to defend the convertibility of the
currency with a larger gold reserve on hand, it was less profitable to hold
barren metal than interest—bearing financial assets.40
The idea that central banks maintained a target level for prices is
another simplifying assumption. Occasionally it is argued that central
banks were concerned ultimately with the domestic currency price of gold
and that they desired only to prevent such fluctuations in prices and
economic activity as might threaten convertibility. By this
interpretation, the price level is properly viewed not as an independentgoal of policy but as an intermediate target whose achievement was helpful
for attaining the ultimate objective: maintaining cori.'ertibility. et
central banks were under pressure throughout the interwar years to respond
actively to internal conditions. The British case provides an illustration
of the pressures brought to bear. British central bankers were publicly
cautious when relating their policy to the state of the domestic economy.
According to Montagu Norman, the Bank of Englands interwar Governor, the
ill effects of a high Bank Rate on domestic industry and trade were greatly
exaggerated and "more psychological than real.'41 Of course, by 1930,
when this statement was made, the Bank had been subjected to Treasury
criticism for more than half a decade; in 1924, a more relaxed time, Norman
had expressed concern for the impact of monetary deflation on the state of
the economy.4 The caution that characterized the Bank's public
pronouncements by the end of the decade can be seen as a response to the
criticism to which it was subjected. Keynes' articles on monetary policy
are the best—known examples of the genre.4Surely, however, the Hank
of England was more profoundly affected by criticism emanating from H.t'l.
Treasury. The principal goals of Treasury policy in the 'twenties were to
retire outstanding debt and to reduce the burden of debt service charges
through conversion of the five percent government loans of 1917 at low
interest rates. Debt service had risen from 11 percent of central
government spending in 1913 to 24 percent in 1920 and more than 40 percent
by the end of the decade.44 Hence between 1925 and 1929 the Treasury
consistently objected to Bank of England initiatives which raised the price
and reduced the availability of credit. These objections were often
communicated to the Bank directly. For example:
"The Sovernor of the Bank called at the Treasury on the 2nd
December [1925] about 7:15 pm, and informed me that there27
was everyprobabilitythat the Bank Rate would be increased
...I reported this to the Chancellor on the following morn-
ing and he at once telephoned to the Governor that if the
rate were raised, he would have to inform the House that it
had been done without his being consulted and against his
wishes. It was not fair to the Exchequer that action should
be taken which affected all its affairs without an opportu-
nity being given to him to consider it. He expressed an
earnest request that action should be derred at any rate
for a week, to enable this to be done.
Whatever the central bankers' beliefs about the effects of monetary
policy, it is difficult to dispute that such pressures would have
encouraged them to act as if they were concerned about the state of
industry and trade. In fact, Bank of England reaction functions for the
period 1925—31 indicate some sensitivity of discount rate policy to the
state of the domestic economy.46 In what follows, the target of a
stable price level can be thought of as shorthand for stable prices1 output
and employment and, depending on the reader's interpretation of the
historical literature, different weights can be attached to internal and
external targets without greatly affecting the results.
B.Specification
Considera world of two identical countries, home and foreign.4'
We log—linearize all relationships and use lower case letters to denote the
logs of the variables represented by the corresponding upper case letters,
except for interest rates which are always measured in levels. Each
country has a model supply ti, which can be thought of as an Ml or M2
measure. This aggregate is the product of the monetary base and the money
multiplier V. The base is made up of domestic credit and the central
bank's gold reserves. The domestic credit component of the base can be
positive or negative, depending on whether central banks hold excess gold
reserves or there is a fiduciary issue outstanding. However, to simplify
the model we abstract entirely from the domestic credit component of the28
48
base.
We assume that a rise in the discount rate, by increasing the cost of
rediscounting at the central bank, induces the consolidated banking sector
to hold a larger ratio of precautionary reserves to liabilities. Hence the
money multiplier depends negatively on the central bank discount rate.




where v is the elasticity of the money supply with respect to the discount
rate r.g denotes the log of the world stock of monetary gold, of which
shares h and (1—h) are held by the domestic and foreign countries. The
demand for real balances is a function of output V and the market interest
rate i:
m —p= — Xi
(2)
—p*= — Xi*
where p and p* denote logs of domestic and foreign prices respectively.
Only mathematical complexity is added by assuming that nominal balances are
deflated by a consumer price index comprised of domestic and foreign prices.
Aggregate supply in each country is an increasing function of
producer prices:
Vs S. — S 4 '. V — YP'—vP Y, /
(3)
=y*(p*)=y*p*
where for convenience we assume constant elasticities of supply (y and
and standardize the normal level of output to unity. These functions
can be thought of as the short—run supply curves of an aggregation of
profit—maximizing firms confronting predetermined wages or material costs.
Rather than introducing costs explicitly, we simply note that the classical
full employment model(y =y*=0)and the seynesian income—e;penditure model y y c can be treated as special cases. The
short—run focus of the model should be borne in mind in the discussion that
follows.
Aggregate demand depends positively on the relative price of imports






We close the model with the open interest parity condition on the
assumption that nonmonetary assets denominated in the two currencies are
perfect substitutes and capital is perfectly mobile.
ii* (5)
The omission of gold production, wealth effects arid dynamics of
adjustment, to mention but a few complications, is obvious. Many of these
complications could be appended to themodel.However, our intent here is
not to build a complete model but to present a simple analytical framework
containing the essential ingredients for the study of a particular
hi stan cml episode.
We now posit an objective function for each country of the form:
-->2+w(h- (6)
where t4 is the weight attached to gold reserves relative to prices, output
and employment.49 We assume h > 1/2 to capture the idea that the two
countries prefer incompatibly large shares of the (log of the> worlds
stock of monetary reserves——in other words, that the gold standard can be
characterized as a competitive struggle fr gold.It will be convenient to
normalize p to zero.To derive a semi—reduced form expression for h, we set each countrys
money supply equal to its money demand and take the difference of these two
rel at ions.
h =1/(2g) Eg +v(r—r*) +(1+ )(p —p*)] (7)
Setting aggregate supply (3)equalto aggregate demand (4) and
substituting each countrys money supply and money demand equations [(I)
and (2)3 into its goods market clearing condition yields a semi—reduced
form for p:





It is evident that this model provides the minimal ingredients for a
study of interdependence. The first element we require for an analysis of
interdependence is that each central bank faces a tradeoff between its
target variables. From (7) and (8):
— —• / — I —
- r 2
and similarly for the foreign country. A rise in the domestic discount
rate increases the domestic money multiplier, putting downward pressure on
the price level, and by reducing domestic money supply relative to domestic
money demand attracts gold from the foreign country.
The second element we require is that the target variables in the home
country are affected by the actions of the foreign central bank. Again
from (7) and (8):
= 0 = <0 (10) -*2 2
-
Anincrease in the foreign discount rate reduces the foreign money
multiplier and the foreign money supply, attracting gold from the home
country and depressing the world price level. Analogous results hold far
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the foreign country.
It is worth noting we have here a case of positive international
transmission. Initiatingan expansionarypolicy in one country leads to
expansion in the other. This result contrasts with the assumption often
made about iriternatiorcal transmission between the wars: that policy was
ubeggar_thy_nelghbarl in the sense that expansion inonecountry caused
contractionin the other. The contrast is due to the way we model the
international monetary regime: in this model of the 1920swith fixed
exchangerates international transmission is positive, while in a
coaparable model of the 1930s with flexible rates, transmission might well
be negative.
The choices confronting centralbankscan be illustrated with two
familiar diagrams. From (9, we know that, given r*, the domestic central
bankcan vary r to attain different combinations of h and p.In Figure
1, the frontier offeasiblecombinations islabelledAA. The optimal
settingfor r is one which achieves a h—p combination tangentto an
indifference curve at the point labelled F.
Consider now a rise in r*. This shifts the AA frontier inward to
A''. The home country's central bank, faced with a smaller world money
supply, is forced to accept lower prices, smaller gold reserves, or a
combination of the two, s drawn, it moves to a point such as U tangent to
a less desirable indifference curve where both prices and reserves have
fallen.
The same exercises can be conducted for the foreign central bank. The
analysis becomes interesting once we combine the two banks' problems and
consider their interaction. This can be done by transposing the
indifference curves to r—r* space as in Figure 2.We read off from Figure
I the home country's rankings of different combinations of the two discounth
A
A'
Figure 1rates. Thus, point E in Figure 2 at the center of the home country's solid
indifference curves corresponds to point E in Figure 1. The fact that the
foreign central banks indifference curves lie to the northwest of the home
central banks indf+erence curves reflects the assumption that the two
central banksideallywish to hold incompatibly large shares of the world's
gold stock. This is accomplished when each bank's discount rate is high
relative to that of its rival.
The downward sloping pp locus depicts combinations of r and r* for
which a price level p obtains. Along parallel lines below and to the
i+t of pp, prices arE highEr, while above and to the right, prices are
lower. With symmetry, the two central banks share a common rank ordering
over prices and the pp line has a slope of —45degrees.
The F and F* curves in Figure 2 are the reaction functions of the two
central banks. The F curve, representing loss—minimizing discount rates
for the hose central bankgiventhe foreign discount rate, is the locus of
points where the tangent to the home indifference curve is horizontal.
Similarly, the F* curve is the locus of points where the tangent to a
foreign indifference curve is vertical. The reaction functions may be
positively sloped, as in Figure 2, or negatively sloped. The slopes can be
derived by substituting the semi—reduced forms for h and p into the
ob)ective function, differentiating with respect to each discount rate and






Bothreaction functions will be positively sloped when the weight attached







p/central bank responds to a foreign discount rate increase by raising its
owr rate, attempting to stem the lass of gold reserves at the cost of still
lower prices. Conversely, both reaction functions will be negatively
sloped when the weight put on gold reserves is relatively small.In this
case, each country responds to a discount rate increase abroad by lowering
its discount rate, attempting to reduce the fall in prices at the cost of
still lower gold reserves. So long as stability is maintained (as can be
shown to obtain under symmetry and under other cases considered below), the
analysis is essentially the same.
The discussion to fallow will concentrate on the configuration
depicted in Figure 2.The case of upward—sloping reaction functions, in
which each country is inclined to respond to a change in the foreign
discount rate in the same direction,appearsto be the historically
relevant case for the 1920s.
C. Solutions
We can now determine the equilibrium values of r and r* under different
solution concepts. 1fter discussing the outcome under different
assumptions, we will ask the question of which solution is likely to
obtain.
First, we consider the model's Nash solution at the intersection of
the reaction functions. Note that in the symmetrical model the two
discount rates are identical at the Nash solution, so the level of prices
and reserves will be the same in each country. In particular, since p =
atthe Nash solution, we can cancel the second additive term in equation
(9) when solving for its characteristics. Differentiating the objective
function with respect to each discount rate under the assumption that the
other discount rate is invariant, setting each solution to zero andequating them yields:
rr[-g+2(h2)J (13)
wherethe N subscript denotes the Nash solution.
Second,we consider the cooperative solution. Under symmetry, each
country holds exactly half the world's monetary gold, and prices are again
identical in the two countries. The best they can then doistosettheir
discountrate equal to one another at the level consistent with p = 0.
Setting(9) equal to zero yields:
* 1— r = r
=—g (14)
where the Csubscript denotes the cooperative
(14)r4> r solong ash> 1/2.
Undersymmetry, the Nash and cooperative
distributions of gold. However, under the assumption of Nash behavior, the
large shares of the world's
discount rates above the
subject ot the
economy, given only the assumption that h> 1/2.
Finally, we consider the case where the home country acts as
Stackelberg leader and the foreign country follows. Substituting the
foreign country's reaction function into the home country's objective
function and minimizing the loss yields the solution depicted at point H in
Figure 2, where a home indifference curve is tangent to the foreign
solution. From (13> and
solutions yield identical
dc-sire of rival banks to possess incompatibly
goldstock causes both banks to elevate their
level consistent with price level p. Each is
misapprehension that a marginal increase in its discount rate will secure
it larger gold reserves at the cost of a relatively small decline in
prices.In fact,each discount rate increase elicits an increase inthe
foreigndiscount rate, yielding the initiating bank no additional gold
reserves but resulting in still lower prices. Thus, the strategic
interaction of central banks imparts a deflationary bias to the world
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reaction function. The home countrys central bank recognizes that if it
lowers its discount rate the foreign central bank will respond in kind.
Hence, it is aware that the loss of gold reserves brought about by its
thscount rate reduction will be partially offset by the reduction in the
foreign discount rate, and that the response of the foreign central bank
will yield further benefits by reinforcing the tendency of lower discount
rates to raise the world money supply and price level. The leader—follower
strategy yields a lower domestic discount rate than the Nash solution,
resulting in a higher level of utility for the domestic country, whose loss
of gold is more than offset by higher prices, output and employment. The
foreign central bank benefits on both counts, since prices are higher and
50 itnow obtains a larger share of the world s gold stock.
In this model, the strategic interaction of central banks imparts a
deflationary bias to the world economy, assuming only that at the optimum
they desire incompatibly large shares of the wcrlds gold stock.
Leadership has advantages over other noncooperative strategies: a country
which tates its foreign rival's reaction into account can initiate a
reduction in discount rates, raising prices and stimulating activity at
home and abroad. Cooperation has further advantages over leadership:
through cooperation both discount rates can be lowered and the deflationary
bias in monetary policy can be eliminated.
D. Sustainable Strategies
To this point we have not addressed the question of which solution is
likely to obtain. In this section we first consider this question using
the symmetrical model of previous sections which is intended to represent
the strategic interaction of two or more comparable financial centers
during the interwar years. We then extend the analysis to a simple38
asymmetrical case intended to capture aspects of the prewar situation.
ssuming that cooperative strategies are not feasible, is the Nash
solution or the Stackelberg leader—follower solution likely to obtain? We
have noted that both countries benefit with movement from the Nash solution
to the leader—follower solution. It is clear also that with upward—sloping
reaction functions the follower reaps the greater gains: while both
countriesbenefit from higherprices, only the follower benefits from a
larger gold reserve. In Figure 2, the gains from discount rate reductions
are evenly distributed among countries as they move down the 45 degree line
toward the origin. Since the leader—follower solution is on the followers
side of that line, the leader reaps the smaller benefits. 1sCooper(1954)
suggests, the fact that the follower reaps the larger benefits encourages
both parties to engage in a game of TMchicken," each attempting to force the
otherto accept the role of leader. There may be e>tended periods when the
Nash solution is observed as this game of "chicken' is being played out.
Clearly this is one way to interpret statements to the effect that the
interwar monetary system was characterized by the absence of leadership.
We might attempt to capture the change in structure of international
financial markets between the end of the 19th century and the interwar
period byadding to themodel an asymmetry in the ability ofdiscountrates
toinfluence international capital flows. ssume that the discount rate of
the domestic central bank (which might be thought of as the Bank of
England) has a larger impact than the foreign discount rate on the domestic
money supply (i.e., that v* =evwhere 0 < 8< 1).In all other
respects, including objective functions, the two countries remain the same.
Since from (9) and (10) dh/dr. =—v./2, the domestic discount rate has a
1 1 1
larger impact than the foreign discount rate on the international
distribution of gold.'I
Strikingly, introducing this asymmetry into the model does not alter
the fact that, in the case of positively—sloped reaction functions, each
country prefers its foreign counterpart to play the Stackelberg leader.
The intuition is straightforward. For simplicity of exposition, consider
the case where v is unchanged from sub—sections B and C above but v* is now
smaller. Since v* =8v,wecan rewrite equation (1) for the foreign country
=-v8r*+ (1—big (1)
and leave the rest of the model unchanged.In this case, the model and its
solutions are the same, except we can think of the foreign central bank as
setting and the domestic central bank as reacting to er* rather than r*.
At each solution, the domestic discount rate is the same as in the
symmetrical case, while the foreign discount rate is simply 8 times its
value in the symmetric model.In r—8r* space, the various solutions could
be depicted by the symmetrical diagram of Figure 2.In r—r* space, the
slope of each reaction function would have to be multiplied by 1/8. All of
the conclusions from the symmetric model concerning the gains to
Stackelberg leaders and followers continue to hold.
The simple asymmetrical model suggests, therefore, that to the extent
that the Bank of England had more power than its foreign counterparts over
the direction of gold flows, this would not have encouraged it to exercise
leadership in the Stackelberg sense.If asymmetries in economic structure
are to provide an explanation for the Bank of England's leadership role,
they must be more subtle than the simple asymmetry considered here.
IV. The Tripartite Monetary Agreement of 1936 and the Role for Cooperation
The devaluation of sterling in 1931 marked the end of the truly
international gold standard of the interwar years. The Bank of England had38
succeeded in holding sterling between the gold points during the period
1925—1930 only under considerable duress. The onset of the Great
Depression then placed a downwardpressureon prices, pushed the government
budget into deficit and by the summer of 1931 raised unemployment rates to
20percent of the insured labor force. Following financial crises in
Austriaand Germany andwiththe Labour and National Government's inability
to takeconvincing steps eitherto balance the budget or to initiate
economic recovery, defense of the sterling parity was abandoned in
September. Against the dollar and the currencies of other countries that
continuedtopeg to gold, the pound depreciated by 25 percent, from $4.86
to $3.75 at the end of the first week of floating.
More than two dozen countries allowed their currencies to depreciate
with sterling, among them most of the Empire, Scandinavia, and Eastern
51
Europe. Germany i-or its part adopted draconian exchange controls and
moved increasingly toward a system of bilateral clearing arrangements with
its Eastern European trading partners.
The United States broke with gold in 1933. In March Roosevelt
restricted foreign exchange dealings and gold and currency movements, and
in April he issued an executive order requiring individuals to deliver
their gold coin, bullion and certificates to Federal Reserve Banks. At
this point, the dollar began to float. By setting a series of
progressively higher dollar prices for gold, the Administration engineered
a significant devaluation. The dollar was finally stabilized in January
1934 at $35 an ounce, 59 percent of its former gold content. The only
major currencies that remained freely convertible were those of the Gold
Bloc countries: France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Poland and Switzerland.
These countries were willing to go to great lengths to defendtheir established parities.
Thus, the international monetary system of the mid—1930s was a hybrid of
different regimes.Britainwas engaged in a managed float administered by
the Exchange Equali:ation ccount (EE). The United States in January 1934
pegged the dollar to gold at the new $35 price but extended convertibility
only to countries on the gold standard. France, under the provisions of the
monetary law of1928,wasfully on thegoldstandard andobligatedto buy
andsell gold without limitat the prevailing prices
slate as the summer of 1936 the official goal of French policywas
todefend and maintain the franc Poincaré. Despite the depth of the
Depression, the Bank of France continued to respond to gold losses by
raising its discount rate. Belgiums devaluation in 1935 served to signal
theextent ofthe francs overvaluation, and confidence was further
underminedby political developments abroad, including Italy's invasion of
Ethiopia, Germanys occupation of the Rhineland, and the outbreak of the
Spanish Civil War. With the formation of Leon Slum's Popular Front
Government an pril 1936, pressure on the franc intensified. Slum was
pledged to stimulate domestic activity while at the same time maintaining
the gold standard parity.. Market participants were aware of the
incompatibility of these objectives. Slums proposals had included public
works and public employment, a reduction in the length of the work week,
paid holidays, universal collective bargaining, and public control of heavy
industry and finance. French labor initiated sit—down strikes soon after
the election to induce speedy implementation of these measures, and the
Bank of Frances gold reserves plummeted as a result of capital outflows.
The Bank responded by raising its discount rate to 6 per cent, three times
the Bank of England's rate. Discrete consideration began to be given to
the possibility of devaluation.40
As devaluation of the franc came to be seen as probable, French
policymakers considered how to capitalize on the situation arid foreign
policymakers how to minimize the damage. Yet the French position was not
without difficulties. One French objective was to devalue by a margin
adequate to secure a competitive advantage——in other words, devaluation on
the 1920s model.Atthesame time, they were constrained by the
necessity of not arousing the indignation of the electorate or their
trading partners. Since the Popular Front had come topowercommitted to
thegold standard, it was desirable that devaluation occur as part of a
multilateral system of exchange rate adjustments which laid the basis for a
general return to gold. Moreover, given the spectre of 1923 and 1926, the
French were concerned that a substantial devaluation might cast doubt on
the credibility of any fixed parity and set off a vicious spiral of
depreciation. To allay speculation the French therefore proposed that
realignment be followed by the establishment of new, more realistic gold
standard parities by the Bank of England, Bank of France and Federal
Reserve.
In addition to the domestic political situation, the Popular Front had
reason to worry about foreign retaliation. Earlier in the decade, France
had imposed new commercial restrictions in response to foreign devaluation,
leaving her little diplomatic defense against the adoption of comparable
measures by the U.S. and U.K. Equally worrisome was the danger of
competitive devaluation. There was no internal code of conduct governing
the management of exchange rates. The British EEA could intervene with
sales of sterling to push the pound down along with the franc, and if 1933
was any indication the 1merican response might be a further devaluation of
the dollar. Hence from the French perspective it was essential before41
proceeding with devaluation to secure an agreement on acceptable margins of
adjustment.
For the British and Americans, the danger attached to a French
devaluation was that it was beggar-thy—neighbar policy. To the extent that
London and Washington viewed one another as inclined to retaliate against a
French. devaluation, each feared that its own competitive position would be
seriously eroded. Moreover, competitive devaluation would only e>acerbate
exchange—rate instability and uncertainty! with a depressing impact on
trade. For the British! the spectre of a French devaluation raised the
further possibility that London's complete control over the foreign
e>change value of sterling would be compromised by French intervention
directed at other targets.
The U.S. and ILK engaged in sporadic negotiations in the spring of
1935, but to little effect since the Americans were primarily concerned to
avoid another round of competitive devaluation while the British were
primarily concerned to retain their freedom of action. Following the
triumph of the Popular Front in 1936, channels of communication between the
governments were reopened. The U.S. continued to press for multilateral
negotiations overacceptablemargins of adjustment, while the U.K. was
willing to go no further than to express its hope that the dollar—pound
rate could be held steady so long as devaluation of the franc was
moderate. Blum and his ministers couched any discussion of
devaluation in terms of a fundamental restructuring of the international
monetary order.In early September the French proposed an agreement among
th three governments which would specify new bands for the franc, dollar
and pound, commit the three governments to collaborative efforts to
maintain those rates, bind them not to devalue except by mutual agreement
of under exceptional and unforeseen circumstances, and compel them to42
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return to gold convertibility once stability was restored.
This ambitious French proposal was coolly received n London and
Washington. The Americans were unwilling to commit to an eventual return
to gold or to stabilizing the dollar within a fixed band. Treasury
Secretary Morgenthau favored only a mechanism for collaboration among the
e>change equalization funds of the three countries and working agreements
about the managementof rates. TheBritish opposed even more strongly any
scheme which threatened to limit their freedom of action.5 British
officials hoped only that Blum and his Minister of Finance Vincent Aural
would devalue the franc in a convincing yet moderate manner, by a margin
large enough to induce foreign capital inflows and permit stabilization but
snaIl enough to leave unaffected relations between London and
Wahi ngton.
The French response to these objections was to drop their proposal for
fixed bands but to continue advocating an eventual return to gold.
However, the Americans and British continued to object to any mention of
the gold standard. By the middle of September the French had begun to
recognize that the only agreement which might prove acceptable to bath
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London and Washington was one couched in very general terms. Anal s
next proposalwas for a singledeclaration by the three governments
pledging to avoid unilateral changes n exchange rates and unnecessary trade
50 restrictions.
'
TheTreasuries and central banks of the three
countries were to agree to cooperate in managing the exchange markets
either through bilateral consultations or multilateral negotiations. This
proved an acceptable formula. However, to hasten their appearance,
Morgenthau suggested substituting for a document signed by the three
governments the simultaneous issuing of separate statements once reference43
to the particularly contentious issues had been removed.
With all reference to the gold standard and fixed parities
eliminated, the Tripartite Declarations, much like the resolutions adopted
at Genoa in 1922, amounted basically to three simultaneous statements of
willingness to engage in consultations among Treasuries arid central
banks.6° No formal mechanism for actuallycoordinating policies was
specified in the documents. Nevertheless, these declarations were seen as
essential to insure that the new level for the French franc would be
defensible. Otherwise, competitive devaluations would be anticipated by
the market and create articipatior.s of a further devaluation of the franc.
In return for extending this expression of cooperation so desired by the
French, the Americans and British hoped that they might be able to
influence Frances choice of parity and prevent an excessive devaluation.
Immediately upon the French devaluation of slightly more than 25
percent arid release of the declarations, continuous cooperation among the
exchange equalization funds and central banks of the three countries
commenced. Belgium embraced the principles of the agreement one day later,
and the Dutch and Swiss governments joined within a month. The agreement
was hailed by the press. As the New York Times put it, '4 streak of
sunlight had broken through the dark clouds of nationalism; International
cooperation was still possible.H
In contrast to the aftermath of the Genoa Conference, specific
arrangements for day—to—day collaboration followed within a month. Under
the provisions of the Gold Agreement Act of October 1936, exchange rates
were agreed to daily arid the three exchange funds cooperated in market
intervention, deciding on a common currency to be bought or sold and
settling accounts daily in gold.6 In this respect, the contrast with
1922 was striking. Part of the explanation for the successful44
implementation of the Tripartite greement lies in the fact that by 1936
the major political obstacles to collaboration——notably Reparations and war
debts——had largely receded from view. t least as important! however, was
explicit recognition that the range of issues subject to collaboration
would be circumscribed and that nothing in the agreement threatened to
undermine each governments independence to formulate domestic policy.
The Tripartite Declarations had warned that although 'in their policy
toward international monetary relations (governments] must take into full
account the requirements of internal prosperity, the constant object of
their policy is to maintain the greatest pc'ssible equilibrium in the system
of international exchange and avoid to the utmost extent the creation of
any disturbance by domestic monetary action.'6 From this statement it
might appear that priority was attached to international policy
coordination.In fact, however, internal balance was explicitly recognized
as the paramount goal of policy, and the maintenance of international
stability was basically a useful ancillary target. s Beyen (1949, p. 112)
suggests, policy coordination was seen not as a positive objective of
policy but as a negative promise not to indulge in initiatives that might
be overly disruptive to the international monetary system.
The international monetary order that emerged from the Tripartite
Agreement placed great emphasis on consultation, but beyond efforts to
coordinate day—ta—day management of the markets placed few restraints on
independent action.It provided no mechanism for the formal coordination
of monetary or fiscal policies. Nothing in either agreement bound the
participating countries to set their exchange rates at current levels.
However, under the new arrangement the dollar began to emerge as the link
between gold and other currencies, a position it was to hold for more thantwo decades following the Second World War. The U.S. was by no means bound
to, stabilize its currency at $35 to an ounce of gold, a price which could
be changed on 24 hours notice. But with the passage of time the
Administration grew increasingly attached to this rate. With the dollar
fixed but adjustable in terms of gold and other currencies adjustable at
thebeginning of each day in termsof the dollar the system resembled a
hybridof Bretton Woods interms ofthe relation between gold and the
dollar> and acrawlingpeg (interms of therelationship between the dollar
andother currencies>.
By the end of 1936, many of the recommendations put forward at Genoa
in 1922 had been implemented butt ironically, at the expense of exchange
rate stability. Consultation among governments aridcentralbanks, so
strongly recommended at Genoa, had been institutionalized under the
provisions of the Gold Agreement Act of October. Consultation e>tended
however only to day—to—day management of exchange markets, national
governments retaining complete discretion to set their external rates.
The dollar—sterling rate was effectively pegged within a narrow band from
the French devaluation in 1936 until the second half of 1939, but the
French engaged in several substantial devaluations in the second half of
1937and again in 1938.The gold economy measures urged at Genoa appeared
in the form of restrictions on the internal circulation of gold coin and
bullion and measures tolimit internationalflows to transactions between
centralbanks and stabilization funds. With the emergence of currency
areas centered upon New York, London and, to a lesser extent, Paris, the
reserve currency arrangement proposed at Genoa increasingly became a
reality. Indeed, to the extent that the dollar was the currency most
tightly linked to gold, it began to exhibit features of the unique role as
an international reserve currency it was to take on after World War II.46
The rolefor policy coordination layin lending a semblance of order to the
currency markets, insuring that retention of a link for gold was consistent
with an adequate level of reserves, and discouraging beggar—thy—neighbor
pOliCy.The role for exchange rateflexibility was to provide governments
with independence of action. We will never know how long this system would
have succeeded in reconciling these objectives.
V.Loncluslon
The interwar period witnessed experiments with every modern
international monetary arrangement: clean floating in the first half of
the twenties arid a gold exchange standard in the second, managed floating
in the early 1930s, and after 1936 the reintroduction of a link with gold
arid a form of adjustable peg. Whether the regime was based loosely on a
system of rules, as in the case of the gold standard, or placed few limits
on the discretion of the authorities, as in the case of floating exchange
rates, policymakers harbored no illusions that the international monetary
arrangementalleviatedthe problem ofinterdependence.In each instance
they sought to insure exchange—rate and balance—of—payments stability by
establishing a framework conducive to international policy coordination.
desire for policy coordination is by itself insufficient to insure
successful collaboration. The aftermath of the Genoa Conference, when
political obstacles impeded efforts to arrange a convention of central
banks, illustrates the pitfalls to successful implementation. Ultimately,
governments turned to noncooperative strategies within the framework of the
gold—exchange standard. The competitive struggle for gold and the
deflationary pressures that resulted indicated clearly the advantages of
cooperation. Therefore, when Frances devaluation in 1936 erased the last
vestiges of the interwar gold standard, policymakers once more attempted to47
establish a framework for coordinated action. On this occasion, not only
was the political situation opportune, but in contrast to earlier efforts
the negotiators carefully circumscribed the range of issues subject to
collaboration and placed relatively few restrictions on each governrnent's
freedom of action. Hence the successful conclusions of the Tripartite
Agreement and the Gold Agreement Act.
What emerges clEarly from this analysis of the interwar period is the
tension which pervades all efforts to coordinate economic policies——a
tension which is certainly evident also in the 1980s. Then as now the
problem for monetary coordination was how to reconcile the need for freedom
of action with the desire for order in foreign exchange markets and with
therecognition that national policies have international repercussions.
Then as now the institutional responsewasa hybrid international monetary
systemcombiningarrangements forexchangemarket managementwith autonomy
ofnational policy, and placing a premium on international policy
coordination without providing a mechanism for bringing it about.48
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